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The shift is pronounced. Among corporations, the early-
adopters of the BOP concept encountered more perils than 
proits. Most left the space entirely (e.g., Nike’s World Shoe 
venture), or shifted their efforts toward corporate social respon-
sibility (CSR) and philanthropic goals (e.g., P&G’s PuR water 
puriication). And new corporate efforts are increasingly start-
ing out in CSR mode with limited, if any, proit aspirations. 
Danone’s partnership with Grameen Bank is  exemplary. 
By contrast, market-based poverty alleviation programs by 
governmental bodies, multilateral agencies, and global devel-
opment institutions are multiplying: from the US AID’s Global 
Development Alliance to the International Finance Corpo-
ration’s new Inclusive Business Group. New social enterprises 
like D-Light and EcoZoom are coming on line regularly. And 
the social venture fund industry, which includes such pioneers 
as the Acumen Fund, is growing in leaps and bounds. 
Our goal with this paper is to shed light on one-half of this 
trend: why are corporations giving up on pursuing growth and 
proits from BOP markets, and what needs to happen to reverse 
this trend? There is a lot at stake for both low-income consum-
ers and the corporations themselves. On one hand, corpora-
tions possess unique resources and capabilities–in consumer 
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Abstract. Over the last half-decade, corporate interest in Bottom of the Pyramid (BOP) – strategies for proit-
ably serving the world’s lowest income consumers–has dropped precipitously or migrated to the CSR (i.e., 
philanthropic) side of the business. We contend that these trends stem from a fundamental misalignment 
generated when BOP is framed and managed as a market-based solution to poverty alleviation rather than an 
internally competitive investment opportunity.
Examining macro, meso, and micro dimensions of a company’s core operations, we argue that if corporations 
are to make BOP part of their investment portfolios, there needs to be four changes to management practice 
which ensure business fundamentals guide decision-making. First, proponents need to drop the development-
infused term “Bottom of the Pyramid” and communicate in terms familiar to and used by the majority of 
business managers in emerging market country ofices. Second, in framing the business case, managers need 
to leave behind exaggerated, emotionally-tinged claims in favor of concrete, bounded opportunities that ad-
dress the objectives and investment parameters of a speciic unit in the company. Third, at the ield level, 
managers need to reorient their focus from co-creation and community engagement strategies to the business 
economic drivers of business unit proitability. Finally, to evaluate projects and investments, managers need 
to measure outputs that link directly to business performance and curtail the growing overemphasis on 
” impact assessments.”
When management academics introduced “Bottom of the 
Pyramid” (BOP) to the business world a decade ago, it was 
heralded as a radical idea. The concept transformed the 
world’s poor from charity cases to be served by governments 
and non-proits into an enormous, untapped consumer market 
hungering after the products of large corporations.1 Discussion 
quickly became action. Venerable irms like Nike, Hewlett 
Packard, Johnson & Johnson, Dow, DuPont, Procter & 
Gamble, SC Johnson and others launched BOP ventures.
Today, interest and momentum around BOP continues to 
grow–it may even be considered a movement. But there’s 
an ironic shift in the movement’s membership that seems 
to have escaped attention: for-proit corporations are rap-
idly falling from its ranks, and illing their place is an 
 expanding number of government and non-proit organi-
zations. In other words, the BOP concept is undergoing a 
complete inversion.
1 See, Prahalad, C. K. and S. L. Hart. 2002. “The Fortune at the Bottom 
of the Pyramid,” Strategy + Business, (26): 2-14 and Prahalad, C. K. and 
A. Hammond. 2002. “Serving the world’s poor proitably,” Harvard 
Business Review, 80(9): 48-57.
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research, product design and development, inancial discipline, 
operational eficiency, and scaling–that let them bring goods, 
services, and beneits into the lives of low-income consumers 
in ways governments and non-proits cannot. On the other 
hand, we believe low-income consumer markets can play a 
valuable role in helping companies meet their unrelenting 
pressure to generate new sources of growth and proits. 
1 The Corporate Disconnect 
We believe the underlying reason for the waning corporate 
appetite for BOP markets stems from a fundamental mis-
alignment. Simply put, the BOP concept and BOP business 
strategies have evolved in such a way that they fail to connect 
up with corporate reality on multiple levels. On a macro- 
level, the overarching principles and frameworks used to 
champion BOP ventures are weakly connected to corporate 
business drivers. On a meso-level, the approach toward mak-
ing the business case and the recommendations for position-
ing ventures skips over the needs of the mid-level managers 
most directly responsible for and accountable to the ventures 
themselves. And on the micro-level, ield-level business 
 development recommendations have all but ignored basic 
business economics, thereby failing to provide project teams 
with critical management tools and frameworks that inject 
inancial rigor and discipline into their projects.
1.1 Macro-Level: Development Speak
Analyze BOP articles and websites, or attend BOP confer-
ences. The dominant buzzwords you’re likely to see or hear 
are ones like “poverty eradication,” “basic needs,” “mutual 
value,” “inclusive value chains,” inclusive capitalism,” “BOP 
as producer,” “community embeddedness,” “public-private 
partnerships,” and “impact assessment.” This isn’t the lan-
guage of business. It is the language of development agencies 
and non-proits. 
It didn’t start this way. The original BOP concept was 
framed through a business lens. The central argument was that 
the lowest-income demographic was a viable consumer base 
of potentially massive proportion. An aside to that central the-
sis was that selling products to low-income consumers could 
lift them out of poverty. Selling products to generate new 
sources of revenue, proit, and growth was the central goal; 
poverty alleviation was merely an externality of the process. 
The shift away from this framing was triggered when 
this original BOP argument came under strong criticism for 
its simplistic consumer choice model of poverty allevia-
tion. Poverty alleviation, the development ield has long 
argued, encompasses issues far beyond those of basic mate-
rial needs to include ones of vulnerability, livelihood sta-
bility, gender equality, voice, economic development, and 
democratic accountability. 2
2 See, W. Sachs (ed.), The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowl-
edge as Power (London and New York, Zed Books, 1992) and Robert 
Chambers, Rural Development: Putting the Last First (Essex, England: 
Pearson Education Longman Limited, 1984). 
But rather than scaling back the grand claims of corpora-
tions’ power to eradicate poverty and focusing on the central 
tenet of proit growth, the ield went with the expanded pov-
erty alleviation narrative. Consequently, the center of gravity 
of the BOP concept shifted. Today, BOP is framed, irst and 
foremost, as a market-based approach to poverty alleviation. 
Business growth and proitability have become lost concepts. 
BOP ventures that “only” try to sell products to low-income 
consumers are apt to be viewed suspiciously and criticized 
for not being true BOP ventures. 
But within corporations, generating proits by selling prod-
ucts to consumers is the engine that drives the system. The 
organizing principles behind corporate routines, systems, and 
controls are proit growth and maximization. Social and 
 environmental values are boundary conditions–they set the 
limits and parameters within which corporations pursue their 
goals. So from a corporate perspective, BOP is now talked 
about in a way that automatically marginalizes it within a 
Corporate Social Responsibility cost-center. 
1.2 Meso-Level: The Missing Middle
When you get past the high-level framing, most of what is 
prescribed fails to respond to the realities of middle manag-
ers. But it is this management tier that is invariably tasked 
with translating a C-suite directive to explore BOP opportu-
nities into a concrete strategy. 
 Consider the issue of making the business case. Mana-
gement prescription invariably relies on an emotionally-
tinged, exaggerated language: billions of un-served people, 
representing trillions in market value, and innovation spill-
overs that are likely to migrate up-market and transform 
 traditional markets. Grandiose statements like “… energy 
pioneers who focus on the base of the pyramid could set 
the stage for one of the biggest bonanzas in the history of 
commerce” are commonplace.3 
While this might be an effective way to catch initial board-
room interest, it provides little utility and direction for the 
middle managers tasked with identifying and recommending 
a path forward. Provocative claims of “great opportunities” 
do not make a business case. Even if top management is 
moved by such appeals and relaxes their company’s evalua-
tion standards, projects built on nothing more than a “Big 
Hairy Audacious Goal” blow expectations out of proportion 
and set middle managers up for failure. 
The tendency to ground the business case in bold claims 
and emotional appeal has resulted in a similarly limited set of 
recommendations for structuring BOP ventures inside a cor-
poration. Almost without fail, the recommendation is to cre-
ate some form of skunk-works–stand alone structures with 
liberal funding, open-ended timelines, and freedom from the 
company’s norms and parameters.4
3 See Christensen, C., T. Craig, and S.L. Hart. 2001. “The Great Disrup-
tion,” Foreign Affairs, 80(2): 80-95.
4 Examples include, Prahalad, C.K. and Hammond, A. “Serving the 
World’s Poor, Proitably,” Harvard Business Review, 80(9): 48-57; 
 London, T. & Hart, S.L. “Reinventing Strategies for Emerging Markets: 
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While these take-it-outside-the-company approaches have 
their place and beneits, they aren’t the kinds of strategies that 
middle managers can sell to a unit’s leadership. Barring a 
CEO-level intervention, the chances of getting BOP ventures 
off the ground are slim to none. And even CEO-level pet 
projects that lack clear rooting in the company’s core busi-
nesses are tenuous, as a change in leadership can leave the 
project without strategic justiication for continued resourc-
ing. Such was the fate of former CEO Carly Fiorina’s high-
proile e-Inclusion initiative at Hewlett-Packard. 
1.3 Micro-Level: Consumer Engagement Myopia
Lastly, when it comes to business implementation strategy, 
there is a myopic focus on the consumer engagement process. 
Going native, immersing oneself in the local culture and so-
cial structure, building trust through dialogue and mutual ex-
change, and then co-creating the offering in close partnership 
with BOP consumers are presented as virtual cure-alls to the 
business challenge of BOP markets.5 
Consider recent references to ChotuKool, a much-hyped 
sub-$70 refrigerator targeting low-income rural consumers 
in India that was developed by Indian conglomerate Godrej 
& Boyce through a co-creation design process that enlisted 
deep involvement of the rural poor: “… the Chotukool busi-
ness is on a path to grow and improve the lives of BoP fami-
lies,” and “Godrej and Boyce in India has enjoyed success 
with its affordable ChotuKool fridge for rural India… The 
ChotuKool was co-designed with village women to assure its 
acceptability, and is distributed by members of a microi-
nance group.”6 A BOP success story? Actually, at the time 
these quotes were written, the ChotuKool had yet to be 
launched nor sell a single unit! 
While we don’t dispute the value of getting close to the 
customer, the reality is that companies would have long-since 
tapped BOP markets had that been the main barrier. Most 
 every consumer products company in the world today has a staff 
of anthropologists and designers with that capability. 
Rather, the biggest barrier has been the underlying struc-
ture of low-income market opportunities and the challenging 
business economics they present:7 the highly-distributed, 
small-scale requirement for business operations combined 
with the high-touch sales strategies needed to get consumers 
Beyond the Transnational Model,” Journal of International Business 
Studies, 35(5): 350-370; Stuart L. Hart, Capitalism at the Crossroads: 
Aligning Business, Earth, and Humanity (Upper Saddle River, New 
 Jersey: Wharton School Publishing, 2007).
5 The intense focus on the consumer engagement process can be ex-
plained, in part, by the shift to a poverty-alleviation framing where is-
sues of participation, empowerment, and capacity-building are central. 
6 See Whitney, P. 2011. “Reframing Design for the Base of the Pyramid.” 
In T. London and S. Hart (Eds.) Next Generation Business Strategies for 
the Base of the Pyramid, FT Press: Upper Saddle River, NJ, 165-192 and 
Nambiar, P. and S. Phadnis. 2011. “Bottom of the Pyramid is Not Only 
About Low-Cost Products, Says Stuart Hart,” Times of India, June 22 
(available at http://articles.timesoindia.indiatimes.com/2011-06-22/india- 
business/29689170_1_bop-pyramid-c-k-prahlad.)
7 Simanis, Erik. 2012. “Reality Check at the Bottom of the Pyramid,” 
Harvard Business Review, 90(6): 120-125.
to adopt never-before-seen products drives up operating costs 
and slows the rate of growth; low price points generate little 
total contribution per sales transaction, thereby putting in-
tense upward pressure on proit margins and pushing up 
working capital requirements; and the higher discount rates 
used to assess ventures in developing country markets slash 
the present value of later-year cash lows. So even if unit-
level proitability is accomplished, the investment model can 
be grim.
But there is precious little treatment of the business eco-
nomic fundamentals in the BOP literature.8 On the contrary, 
decision making on the basis of the numbers has been dis-
couraged, on the basis that it will constrain out-of-the box 
thinking. That’s left middle managers lying blind. 
2 The BOP Protocol: A Microcosm of the Field
Our experience with an applied research project called the 
Base of the Pyramid Protocol serves as a powerful example 
of the chasm that exists between the BOP concept and corpo-
rate reality.9 The effort, which we launched in 2004 with col-
leagues, aimed to create a corporate innovation process for 
proitably serving low-income communities while advancing 
their broader development. 
In retrospect, the BOP Protocol methodology contained the 
same gaps we’ve described above. First, it was weighted to-
wards poverty alleviation and drew liberally on development 
methods, like participatory rural appraisal. The model was 
built on the concept of “mutual value creation,” and included 
core processes like building “deep dialogue” and “collective 
entrepreneurship capability.” That accounted, in part, for the 
lofty, abstract framing of the opportunity, as in: “We believe 
the interconnected challenges of addressing poverty and hu-
man development and restoring global ecological systems 
present MNCs with a unique opportunity – a ‘license to imag-
ine,’ to re-conceptualize the corporation in a manner that can 
sustainably serve the diverse needs and values of people 
across the globe.”10
Our recommended structure for a BOP venture was a form 
of skunk-works: an R&D White space reporting to the top 
management team and operating outside the company’s core 
routines, processes, and procedures. Lastly, the core method-
ology and focus of the approach was business co-venturing: 
deep engagement of the community from concept develop-
ment through to enterprise creation. 
Three ventures used the BOP Protocol: an initial pilot in 
Kenya by SC Johnson; the DuPont subsidiary, Solae, in India; 
and a US-based effort on healthcare provision in low-income 
8 For an exception, see Karamchandani, A., M. Kubzansky, and N. Lalwani. 
2011. “Is the Bottom of the Pyramid Really for You?” Harvard Business 
Review, 89(3): 107-111.
9 E. Simanis and S. Hart (with Justin DeKoszmovszky, Patrick Donohue, 
Duncan Duke, Gordon Enk, Michael Gordon, and Tatiana Thieme). 
2008. The Base of the Pyramid Protocol: Toward Next Generation BOP 
Strategy, available at http://www2.johnson.cornell.edu/sge/docs/BoP_
Protocol_2nd_ed.pdf. 
10 E. Simanis and S. Hart. 2008. ibid
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communities. All three failed.11 Their failure, however, is not 
the central issue: the success rate for any high-risk venture is 
low. What is instructive is how they failed. All of the projects 
experienced a vicious cycle.
2.1 The Downward Spiral
Consider the details of the Solae venture in India.12 To begin, 
various statements of the project goal were broad and lofty, as 
in “to deliver within a sustainable framework enhanced nutri-
tional products to consumers at the bottom of the pyramid” 
and “to rapidly develop the capabilities to enable Solae to 
proitably build a signiicant, recognized presence in emerg-
ing markets.”13 Once India was chosen as the project site, 
projections were made of the massive potential consumption 
of soy protein should India’s 500 million BOP consumers 
consume a spoonful of soy protein daily. 
The project was begun without concrete success criteria 
linked to speciic business objectives. Rather, the targeted 
output was a nebulous “new business model” for BOP mar-
kets globally. The business model was to be truly novel–some 
holistic solution to malnutrition that might leverage informal 
social networks to channel a new protein-based food product 
into the diet of low-income Indians. 
Structurally, project leadership rested in the hands of a se-
nior manager in a corporate-level function reporting to the 
President of the company. There was no strategic or opera-
tional link with the India country ofice. This matched our 
recommendation for an R&D White space. 
In-ield work was driven by our co-venturing methodology. 
Together with a team of women from low-income villages 
and slum communities, we began co-creating business con-
cepts. Unfortunately, the community’s ideas were plain and 
simplistic: a restaurant that sells meals made with soy pro-
tein; a bakery that sells snack foods with soy protein; a cater-
ing company that sells foods made with soy protein. In the 
name of co-creation, two months were spent trying to move 
the community team toward more compelling concepts while 
ensuring they retained a sense of ownership. 
The inal concepts outlined high-level models to address-
ing community health and welfare with soy protein as one 
piece of an integrated solution. Our goal of identifying a nov-
el BOP business model seemed to have been met. Project 
leadership gave a green light to move forward, and we shifted 
into pilot mode. 
But involving the local community team closely in deci-
sion-making and execution to maintain our commitment to 
co-creation slowed progress further. The women lacked basic 
business know-how. When Solae’s team tried to accelerate 
the project and keep to a reasonable business time-line, the 
11 The failure of the SC Johnson venture in Kenya to yield a proitable 
business and its subsequent transition to a non-proit initiative are re-
counted on pages 72-77 of this volume in the article by Tatiana Thieme 
and Justin DeKoszmovszky.
12 The irst author of this paper served as the venture’s initial ield lead 
and then as a close consultant until the project’s end.
13 See Simanis, E. “The Anatomy of Market Creation: Insights from the 
Base of the Pyramid,” Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 2010. 
community team questioned Solae’s motives and commit-
ment to partnership. Additional time was needed to address 
the rift in trust. 
Then, a change in leadership at the level of President oc-
curred. New leadership requested detailed background on 
the project and the inancials for the business. What we had 
to offer was the broad project intent, a detailed account of 
the co-creation work, and two high-level business concepts–
but nothing about business economics drivers or measurable 
 targets linked clearly to the company’s core strategies. The 
response, in retrospect, was predictable and reasonable: shut 
it down. A one-year extension was granted to fulill a com-
mitment to the communities.
The ield teams pushed ahead: products were inalized and 
priced, packaging developed, and the venture launched in a 
few months time. Initial sales were promising, but the time 
required to convince consumers to buy the soy-protein–the 
high margin product anticipated to be the business’s revenue 
driver–was much longer than anticipated. And repeat sales 
were low. That spurred the community team to move out to 
more distant villages in search of new customers. The much 
longer travel times, however, cut into the time they had for 
doing sales. They also shifted focus to the easier to sell, low-
priced snack foods (fortiied with soy protein) readily con-
sumed in the communities. But because of the low price 
point and very low margins on the snack foods, the volumes 
needed to cover the ixed costs required a much larger pop-
ulation base than what the business could reach cost- 
effectively. The economic fundamentals were overwhelming 
the co-creation vision. 
To make the business case to Solae leadership and alleviate 
concerns about these early challenges, a business plan and a 
discounted cash low model (DCF) were developed. But even 
the most optimistic growth projections in the DCF had the 
business generating signiicant negative cash lows for the 
next ive years. So even if we could solve the revenue model 
dilemma of the business unit, our investment model was a 
non-starter. The game was over–and for good reason.
The project’s end, however, had further repercussions. 
Inside Solae and its parent company, DuPont, the concept of 
Bottom of the Pyramid became tagged as a kind of communi-
ty-based development work. In other words, BOP was not 
about growth and proits, but about corporate social responsi-
bility and philanthropic efforts. 
This downward spiral is a pattern that we have seen re-
peated in the other BOP Protocol ventures and in corporate 
BOP ventures more generally. Corporations start with grand 
expectations, task special project teams with curing a social 
ill, develop complex, holistic business models, and then fail 
to come anywhere close to making the numbers work. The 
company’s interest in BOP fades. 
3 Reversing the Trend:  
 Back to Business Fundamentals
To re-ignite and sustain corporations’ interest in the vision of 
proitably serving the world’s lowest-income consumers, com-
panies need to re-frame the BOP concept. As heretical as it 
may sound to some, poverty-alleviation must be subordinated 
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to business goals. Poverty alleviation has to become the positive 
externality–a by-product of the activities that drive business suc-
cess in the most eficient and most rapid way possible. 
To put this change into practice, we propose four speciic 
reversals that move companies back to business fundamen-
tals and the day-to-day realities of middle managers. We 
 illustrate our ideas by drawing on our experience supporting 
a new venture by SC Johnson in Ghana in partnership with 
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. The project has the 
overarching goal of creating a consumer-focused business 
that helps reduce malaria transmission in low income, rural 
populations. But the direction and management of that effort 
by the SC Johnson project team has been consciously done 
to keep the project in the core of the company’s business 
operations and out of the margins of corporate social respon-
sibility. While the project is still at a very early stage–at the 
time of this writing, the business is two months away from 
launching pilot sales–we and the SCJ team are seeing a sig-
niicant change in internal understanding, receptivity, and 
ield-level rigor.14 
3.1 Reversal I: From Bottom of the Pyramid  
to D&E Consumers/Markets
Our irst reversal may come across as anathema to some: 
managers need to drop the term “Bottom of the Pyramid” 
 altogether and shift, instead, to using the term “D&E 
Consumers” or “D&E Markets.” 
As we noted above, BOP is strongly associated with–if 
not dominated by–a poverty alleviation perspective. The 
term conjures images of solving basic human needs, lifting 
people out of poverty by integrating the poor into a compa-
ny’s supply chain, and working with the poor as partners to 
building empowered communities. Using the term “BOP” 
sets a project up for being viewed and treated internally as a 
corporate social responsibility effort. Internal alignment 
will be a constant challenge. 
Using the term “BOP” is also a precarious external commu-
nication strategy. Many people will judge corporate communi-
cations that talk about the company’s “BOP work” according 
to the expansive meaning of the concept. So ventures that are 
“only” trying to sell products are open to criticism and being 
labeled “a poverty wash.” 
To get companies focused on this space as part of core 
business, it has to look like, sound like, and smell like core 
business: in other words, it has to be about generating reve-
nue, growing proits, and selling the company’s products to 
the poor–not broad-based poverty alleviation. Using the 
term “D&E consumers” sends this message. It is a consumer 
classiication that business managers across emerging and 
14 To be clear, we are not claiming that our approach guarantees project 
success. Low-income markets are challenging and complex business 
environments, and there is no silver bullet. Rather, the goal of the guide-
lines described here is to ensure that managers link the venture directly 
to the irm’s core interests and operational norms, and manage the effort 
with business rigor. Doing so preserves internal credibility for and inter-
est in Bottom of the Pyramid as a business opportunity, regardless of the 
success or failure of any single project. 
developed markets have used for a long time. It refers more 
or less to the same socio-economic group that comprises the 
Bottom of the Economic Pyramid, but does so in a way that 
breeds familiarity and understanding. 
In the Ghana project, the term “Bottom of the Pyramid” has 
been scrubbed from internal communications and replaced 
with D&E consumers. At the country-level, that simple 
change has helped clarify to local management how the proj-
ect complements their business strategy and will contribute to 
their inancial performance. A similar impact can be noted at 
the regional and corporate level. Despite recent changes in 
senior management, the SCJ project team has been able to 
gain alignment relatively quickly on the project’s business 
intent. While much of the credit for the smooth transition 
goes to the organizational foundation laid by SC Johnson’s 
project directors, anchoring communications around D&E 
consumers has played a valuable contributory role.
In addition, the project team’s information requests from 
other departments and country ofices seem to receive higher 
priority. That makes sense: when the project is framed as 
reaching D&E consumers, all staff and employees–no matter 
where they are based–immediately sense that it as an issue 
central to the company’s goals and performance.
3.2 Reversal II: From Boardroom Rhetoric  
to Grounded Opportunities
A second key shift is to dial back the rhetoric about the busi-
ness case, leaving behind claims of hundreds of millions, if 
not billions, of dollars of market potential with the possibil-
ity of disrupting an entire industry. Instead, managers tasked 
with making a business case for a D&E venture need to iden-
tify concrete, bounded opportunities that dovetail with the 
objectives and investment parameters of a speciic unit in the 
company–a speciic department, business, geography, or 
brand. The goal is to demonstrate to the unit’s leadership 
how an investment targeting D&E consumers helps the unit 
achieve its targets more effectively than other available in-
vestment options. 
That requires framing D&E opportunities within success 
criteria and objectives important to that business unit–be it 
growth in case sales of current products, growth in new prod-
uct category sales, or growth in share of wallet of existing 
customers. It also requires matching the opportunity to the 
unit’s particular constraints and norms for investments: things 
like timeframes within which projects are expected to bear 
fruit, investment intensity proiles, accepted levels of risk, 
upside potential, and metrics for evaluating progress and 
 determining whether a project merits ongoing investment. 
The SC Johnson Ghana project is instructive on this issue. 
The project sits in the company’s developing markets plat-
form on the proit and loss side of the business. It reports to 
that unit’s senior leadership and maintains a dotted line to the 
country-level leadership, as the intent is for the venture to be 
absorbed into the Ghana country ofice once proof of concept 
is established. 
The project’s focus on D&E consumers is complementary 
with existing initiatives under the platform. Like many 
 consumer products companies in developing countries, 
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SC Johnson is experimenting with different distribution mod-
els to reach beyond the upper and middle class A&B consum-
ers and out to C-level consumers in urban areas that frequent 
informal sector outlets (mom-and-pop shops). The project’s 
focus on rural D&E consumers moves the goal posts one step 
further out, so there is better clarity how the venture makes a 
distinct contribution to the platform’s core strategies. 
Furthermore, the business objective was tightly bounded: 
To drive broad adoption of SCJ’s product categories (insect 
control, home cleaning, and air care) by low-income consum-
ers in two rural districts of Ghana. Not all of Africa, nor even 
all of Ghana–just the consumers living in two districts. That 
has shaped expectations of the initial opportunity size and 
provided a concrete reference point for longer-term projec-
tions of business potential.
3.3 Reversal III: From Consumer Engagement  
to Business Economic Drivers 
The third shift is a change in emphasis at the ield-level. 
While consumer engagement is, without question, a valuable 
tool for addressing certain business challenges, the ield’s 
captivation with co-creation is distracting companies from 
the key issues that impact success. As noted earlier, business 
failure is invariably driven by the enormously challenging 
business economics of serving D&E consumers. That’s where 
managerial focus must be at all times. 
Understanding the key business economic drivers before 
product design happens is critical, as the offering and the 
business model need to factor-in and relect those economic 
drivers. And as the project moves into launch and pilot 
stage, these drivers are a critical management tool for focus-
ing time and attention, ensuring alignment from leadership 
down to the ield. It’s an approach that venture capitalists 
and seasoned entrepreneurs have long counseled.15 It’s good 
business fundamentals. 
Even as early-stage consumer research was being done in 
the SC Johnson venture in Ghana, key business challenges and 
drivers were tracked. On the supply-side, it was the limitations 
and boundary conditions under which the business would have 
to operate, such as the scale of the business and the human 
 resource base needed to service the target area. On the consum-
er-side of the equation, it was factors such as the pattern of 
behavior change that would be entailed with our underlying 
product categories, as well as the segments of the population 
that would act as change enablers and potential disrupters.
These drivers were plugged into the inancial model so that 
initial break-even sensitivity analysis could be conducted. Out 
of that, a pattern emerged as to what would be feasible and 
necessary in terms of a ixed cost base, wages, price points, 
gross margins, penetration rates, and customer sales loads. 
One key insight that the focus on business drivers yielded, for 
example, was the need for an aggregated customer to manage 
the required customer load per sales person. Having this 
15 See, Mullins, J. and R. Komisar. 2009. Getting to Plan B: Breaking 
Through to a Better Business Model, Harvard Business Press: Cam-
bridge, MA.
framework in place before product and business model brain-
storming began allowed different ideas to be screened for 
 basic viability.
As the project approaches pilot phase, the level of detail of 
the model has increased, thereby giving everyone a more nu-
anced understanding of key determinants of business success. 
For example, due to the high sign-up cost of a new customer, 
customer retention rate emerged as a new driver. Having 
clear business unit numbers has also allowed a project-level 
inancial model to be created. Insights around the timeline 
and rate of growth needed for a positive net-present-value 
further informed the offering and business model. 
Today, the venture is guided by a dashboard of the critical 
business drivers, the assumptions to be tested, and the targets. 
Apart from providing focus at the ield level, the dashboard 
and extensive grounding of the business concept in economic 
fundamentals has helped in creating alignment–and possible 
project legitimacy–with new senior leadership in the devel-
oping markets platform, as information and reporting is being 
done in a manner that relects the unit’s norms. 
3.4 Reversal IV: From External Impact Assessment 
to Internal Business Performance 
The last change concerns how companies and managers think 
about and evaluate their D&E investments and ventures–a 
hot topic in the ield. In place of the recommended “impact 
assessment”–a term and practice used by development insti-
tutions and non-proits to assess the changes in the lives of 
the people and communities into which they intervene–man-
agers of D&E ventures should focus their time and energy on 
what companies already assess as part of regular operations: 
their internal business performance and the key factors that 
inluence it. 
Impact assessments make sense for development institu-
tions and non-proits, as their ultimate goal is to have an 
 external impact. Donors give money to non-proits on the 
 assumption that it will have the greatest impact on the social 
or environmental issue at stake. Self-obsolescence is a sign of 
a mission accomplished. With non-proits, the organization is 
the means, and the social change is the end.
The situation is exactly opposite for a corporation. A cor-
poration’s end goal is to sustain and grow itself. Investors 
give money with the expectation that the company will gen-
erate additional proits that allow it to repay the original in-
vestment with a dividend. So the changes in people’s lives 
that a company’s products and operations bring about are 
simply a means to the company’s growth and longevity. 
Consequently, the kinds of external impacts that make sense 
for companies to track are those that have a strong impact on 
its own internal health and wellbeing.16 
16 This does not preclude, nor is it an argument against, corporations set-
ting broad social and environmental goals as part of a commitment to 
certain values and standards of operation and then measuring perfor-
mance against those goals. The key point, as stated earlier, is that those 
corporate-level objectives set guidelines and parameters–the internal 
rules of the game–for how the company’s managers and employees per-
form their core roles. 
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Of course, one can argue that any information can be useful 
input to a company’s strategy or marketing campaigns. True. 
But in a world of limited time and resources, what gets 
 collected and analyzed must be prioritized according to its 
impact. Collecting customer feedback on what the customer 
liked and disliked about the company’s product, and her rec-
ommendations for improvement, is a form of assessment data 
that has clear strategic value for any company. Data collec-
tion around generic poverty alleviation indices–such as the 
degree to which women customers have greater voice or 
whether their children attend school more frequently than 
children of non-customers–is (for most companies) of little 
strategic value, as the connection to internal business perfor-
mance is tenuous.
As we noted above, the SC Johnson Ghana venture has an 
underlying social objective: the prevention of malaria con-
traction in low-income, rural populations. But SC Johnson’s 
ability to have an impact on this broad issue stems from the 
fact that it has products (e.g., OFF!® personal repellent lotion 
and Raid® insecticide) that kill or repel mosquitoes. The 
product formulations and active ingredients are scientiically 
proven to have that effect. 
All partners in the project have agreed that it makes no 
business sense for SC Johnson to measure whether there was 
a reduction in malaria contraction in the target market. Apart 
from the complex causal chains around malaria contraction, 
preventing malaria has no direct impact on SC Johnson’s 
ability to meet payroll, pay suppliers and creditors, and invest 
in new sources of growth. 
In assessing social impact from a business perspective, 
the challenge is to identify a key business outcome that 
proxies for the targeted social outcome. Again, the goal is to 
accomplish the social objective as a by-product of core busi-
ness operations. In the SC Johnson Ghana example, the out-
come that does directly affect the company’s organizational 
health–and which correlates with the social outcome of 
 malaria prevention–is the number of units sold of the 
 mosquito-related products. While far from being a perfect 
measure of malaria impact from a public-health perspec-
tive, “units of product sold” is the best business metric by 
which to gauge this social impact. 
4 Conclusion
The vision that corporations can grow proits and eradicate 
poverty was and is a noble and provocative one. The BOP 
concept has inspired people to think differently about the 
contributions that different sectors can make to complex 
 social issues, and catalyzed a valuable new dialogue among 
businesses big and small, governments, and non-proits. 
But the time has come to move beyond the purity of that vi-
sion, and to take up in earnest the day-to-day realities of man-
agers in the world’s corporations. Unless we bring business 
fundamentals back to the forefront of the BOP concept, corpo-
rate interest in the subject will continue its rapid decline.
And that’s going to mean tradeoffs in our vision. 
Corporations were not built to do poverty alleviation; they are 
not non-proits. They are a distinct institution, with different 
resources, different responsibilities, and, therefore, different 
limitations. We should no more expect corporations to practice 
poverty alleviation in the same manner as non-proits and gov-
ernment agencies, than we should encourage non-proits and 
government agencies to think and operate as corporations.17 
The important point is that corporations can bring substan-
tial value into the lives of low-income consumers by doing 
what they do best–selling products and services that generate 
proits. Maximizing the sector’s potential for positive impact, 
then, requires returning the focus on business fundamentals. 
We believe that the reversals outlined here are a valuable irst 
step in that direction.
17 Google founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin learned the intractable 
challenges of the latter in their efforts with Google.org, the recently- 
established philanthropic arm of Google. See: Strom, S. and M. Helft. 
2011. “Google Finds It Hard to Reinvent Philanthropy,” The New York 
Times, January 29.
